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Introduction 
The Communist movement in the Arab World and Iran has been as complex and 
multifaceted as the region itself. Since the early modern period, the Ottoman and Qajar 
Empires had been pressured culturally, socially, militarily, and economically by an ever-
expanding Europe. By the nineteenth century, the Sublime Porte was reduced to a pawn 
in a game of European chess. The ‘Eastern Question’ dominated European politics in the 
long nineteenth century, and was arguably one of the chief causes of the Great War. 
Persia, too, was at the mercy of Western powers, with Britain and Russia having carved 
up the empire into spheres of influence. The Ottomans, and to a lesser extent the Qajars, 
decided to modernise and Westernise their empires to try to close the gap that had 
opened up in the economic, scientific, and, not least, military, fields. Western experts were 
brought in to oversee the modernisation, and scores of Ottoman subjects were sent 
abroad to study the new ideas. As the interaction between East and West thus increased, 
new revolutionary ideas originating from the French Revolution and tested in the 
uprisings of 1848-49, and again during the Paris Commune, made their way into the 
Middle East. At first, these ideas were mainly diffused among the large European 
communities that had settled in such cities as Alexandria, Beirut, and Istanbul. In Persia, 
the new ideas began to spread in Azerbaijan, situated on the border with Russia. The 
spread of Socialist and Communist ideas to the Arab World and Iran was thus intimately 
linked to the modernisation process and the region’s gradual subjugation to the West. 
This made for a peculiar situation, in which the social, economic, political, and military 
system that was responsible for the region’s subjugation also had produced the ideology 
with which this system could be resisted. Communism, then, was viewed with suspicion 
as essentially being a European idea. Nationalism and religion acted as bulwarks against 
its diffusion. Nevertheless, throughout the twentieth century, Communism spread across 
the region and at times, it achieved great popularity. Ultimately, however, it was defeated 
as idea and movement by nationalism and the self-interests of the Soviet Union. 
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 As essentially a European affair, socialist ideas were initially circulated amongst 
communities of French, Italian, Russian, or English workers. There were no translations 
into Arabic, Farsi, or other regional languages. This, naturally, prevented the spread of 
the ideas beyond this narrow group, as most indigenous people were not versed in 
European languages. There were, however, communities of non-Muslims that, for 
historical and religious reasons, did speak these languages. The many Christian sects 
scattered across the region, such as the Copts in Egypt, the Maronites in Lebanon, the 
Assyro-Chaldeans in Mesopotamia, the Armenians in Anatolia and throughout the region, 
and also Jews living in many of the main cities, had well-established links with the 
Western powers, for religious, cultural, or economic reasons. Like their ancestors during 
the Islamic conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries, who as learned men of the 
ancient world had translated and transmitted its knowledge, the region’s minorities again 
played a crucial role in the dissemination of new ideas. 
 An early dilemma for those faced with transmitting the vast literature of Socialism, 
and later Communism, was translation of the terms themselves. How could ideas steeped 
in the philosophical tradition of Europe, and derived from its cultural language, Latin, be 
rendered into Arabic and other regional languages without losing their meaning? For a 
while, the problem was left unresolved. The early activists simply transliterated 
‘Socialism’ into sūsyālizm. While this practice was continued in Iran and Turkey, in the 
Arabic-speaking areas the term ishtirākiyyah soon became the established translation of 
‘Socialism’. Ishtirākiyyah is derived from the root shīn (sh), rāᵓ (r), kāf (k), which in its 
original denotation means ‘to share’, and in stem form VIII ‘to cooperate’, or ‘to enter into 
partnership’. This may seem like a suitable translation, as sharing and cooperating could 
be said to be essential components of the Socialist creed. However, the problem with 
translation or transmittance of philosophical ideas from one socio-cultural context to 
another, and in this case from a completely different language family, is that the 
connotations are entirely different. In the case of ishtirākiyyah, as with most other 
philosophical terms in Arabic, these connotations are firmly rooted within an Islamic 
(and Christian) socio-cultural context. Thus, for instance, the word shirkah or sharikah, 
which is derived from the same root, could mean either a ‘commercial business’, or, in the 
Christian tradition, a ‘communion’. Both connotations undoubtedly give off the wrong 
impression. Moreover, the term shirk, again derived from the same root, means 
‘polytheism’ or ‘idolatry’, and is derived from stem form IV ashraka,1 which arguably is 
the worst possible association any concept could have in a Middle Eastern context.  
 The same type of problem was encountered with the term ‘Communism’. In Iran, 
it was again left untranslated as kūmunizm, whereas in the Arab World it was translated 
as shuyūᶜiyyah. The latter derives from the root shīn (sh), yāᵓ (y), ᶜayn (ᶜ), and its basic 
meaning is ‘to spread’. The term is formed from the verbal noun shuyūᶜ, which, depending 
on context, could mean ‘spread’, but also ‘publicity’ or ‘circulation [of news]’. The political 
term ‘collectivism’ has also been constructed from the verbal noun of stem form IV, 
ishāᶜah, on the same pattern as shuyūᶜiyyah, namely ishāᶜiyyah. The reason for this goes 
back to Islamic history, where mushāᶜ was a particular form of joint or collective 
ownership, in accordance with Islamic Law, the sharīᶜah. Mushāᶜ lands were usually tribal 
                                                          
1 Ashraka bil-lāhi, to ‘attribute associates to God’, i.e. to be a Polytheist. 
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or village lands that were owned collectively. This practice undoubtedly bore some 
resemblance to Marx’s notion of ‘primitive Communism’, which he, and Engels, envisaged 
as a distinct stage in the development of human societies, occurring before more 
advanced slave-owning societies.2 However, the religious and tribal connotations of the 
concept were again something that created the wrong impression. Moreover, the root 
from which shuyūᶜiyyah is derived is also the root that form the term shīᶜah – the 
followers of ᶜAli. The fact that shuyūᶜī, ‘a communist’, dialectically is pronounced more 
like shūᶜī makes it almost a homonym of shīᶜī, ‘a shiite’.3 This linguistic link with the 
largest Muslim ‘minority’, coupled with the fact that Communism became very popular 
among some Shiᶜah communities in places like Iraq and Lebanon, added to the sense that 
communism was a ‘minority ideology’ challenging the dominant Sunni superiority of the 
region.4  
Given the dominance of Islam on the political and philosophical planes at the 
beginning of the modern period, it was to be expected that any terms chosen as 
translations for ‘communism’ and ‘socialism’ would be problematic and laden with 
religious connotations. On the other hand, the path chosen in Iran, where the terms were 
left untranslated, was hardly more conducive to the acceptance of the terms amongst the 
population, but, at the very least, it avoided the added difficulty of association with 
religion and Islamic tradition. 
Having established these fundamental linguistic, socio-historical, and 
philosophical differences, our focus now turns to the Communist movement itself as it 
evolved in the Middle East. As will be made clear in this chapter, this movement 
essentially had a dualist, almost schizophrenic, nature. On the one hand, there was the 
Communism of the October Revolution, the Communist International (Comintern), and 
the universal idea of the world revolution. On the other hand, there was the Middle 
Eastern reality, with imperialism, nationalism, and religion. The former insisted on 
ideological purity, on the ‘Dictatorship of the Proletariat’, and on ‘Proletarian 
Internationalism’. The latter was mired in tribalism, religious fanaticism, and the struggle 
for modernity. Nationalism, not internationalism, was the watchword of this world. 
There, it was not the ‘proletariat’ – which hardly even existed – but intellectuals and 
people from the professional classes, the so-called effendiyyah, that were the vanguard of 
Communism. The story of Communism in the Arab World and Iran is thus not a single 
story, but two stories of incompatible movements – one guided and steered from Moscow, 
seeking in vain to emulate the achievements of the Russian Communists, and another 
more intent on feeling which direction the winds of the Middle East were blowing, and 
looking not towards Moscow, but towards Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad for its 
leadership. 
                                                          
2 See, for instance, Friedrich Engels, The Origin of Family, Private Property and the State, 1884. 
3 For the full derivations of these terms, see Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Arabic, ed. by J. Milton 
Cowan, Beirut: Librarie du Liban, 1980. 
4 On this particular point, see Silvia Naef, ‘Shīᶜī-Shuyūᶜī or: How to Become a Communist in a Holy City’, in 
The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Religious Culture & Political History, Rainer Brunner and Werner Ende, 
eds. (Leiden: Brill, 2001), pp. 255-267. 
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The First World War had a cataclysmic effect on the Middle East. The Ottoman 
Empire, which had sided with Germany during the war, was defeated and the ‘Eastern 
Question’ was forcibly solved once and for all. The empire was dismantled and in its stead, 
the victorious parties (Britain, France, Italy, and the USA) created new states that were to 
be supervised by a mandate system, under the auspices of the newly established League 
of Nations. Britain became the mandatory power for the new states of Iraq, Transjordan, 
and Palestine, and, in addition, a British protectorate was declared over Egypt – under 
British occupation since 1882. France took control over Syria and Lebanon. To the east, 
Iran managed to retain its empire, but British influence made it a semi-independent state 
at best. This was clearly illustrated when in 1925, the Qajar dynasty was ended by a 
British-supported military coup, carried out by Reza Khan, who later declared himself 
king (shah) and started the Pahlavi dynasty.5 
 In the Arabic-speaking countries, ideas of nationalism were beginning to take firm 
root.6 During the war, Britain had instigated an Arab Revolt under the leadership of Sharif 
Husayn of Mecca, who had been promised an ‘independent Arab kingdom’ at the war’s 
conclusion. However, other pledges to the French, and to the Zionist movement, resulted 
in a significantly reduced area of Arab control. A compromise solution, which satisfied 
no-one, was found whereby Sharif Husayn’s sons, Faysal and ᶜAbdallah, became kings in 
Iraq and Transjordan, respectively, whereas Syria and Lebanon was handed over to the 
French, and Palestine set apart as a ‘national home’ for the Jews. These machinations 
created a post-war situation in which resentment towards Britain for the broken 
promises soon outweighed any goodwill that had been created by the overthrow of the 
Ottomans. Coupled with hatred of the French for having stolen Syria, which in many ways 
was the epicentre of Arab nationalism, and the Zionists for colonising Palestine, anti-
imperialist nationalism soon emerged as the dominant idea amongst the politically 
conscious segments of the population.7 In Iran, frustration with a struggling 
modernisation process, which had stalled since the days of the Constitutional Revolution 
of 1905-7, and British meddling in internal affairs, as well as deep resentment against 
British attempts to secure favourable terms for its capitalist enterprises in the country, 
meant that the dominant sentiment there was hardly any less anti-British. 
 Resistance against the new order became legion. A ‘revolution’ broke out in Egypt 
when in 1919 Saᶜd Zaghlul and his followers were refused permission to form a 
delegation to the post-war peace negotiations at Versailles. The following year, anti-
Jewish riots broke out in neighbouring Palestine, and when the Iraqi mandate had been 
confirmed by the San Remo Conference in April 1920, a widespread revolt rocked that 
country from the summer onwards. In Syria, disapproval of the mandate system, and 
especially the French insistence on ‘divide and rule’ tactics – as seen in the division of 
Syria along religious lines – kept unrest simmering until it finally broke out in full-scale 
rebellion between 1925-27. Iran, which had avoided being forcibly broken up, largely 
                                                          
5 See, Cyrus Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Power (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 1998. 
6 For a discussion of the development of Arab nationalism see, Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the 
Liberal Age 1798-1939 (Oxford University Press, 1962; republished by Cambridge University Press, 1983).  
7 See, Timothy J. Paris, Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule: The Sherifian Solution (London: Frank Cass, 
2003). 
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remained free of anti-western rebellions. However, in the far north of the country – where 
Russian influence was felt the strongest – turmoil followed the war. In the Iranian parts 
of Azerbaijan, which lie on the borders with Azerbaijan in Russia, an uprising under 
Shaykh Mohammed Khiyabani erupted in the aftermath of the war. In Gilan, another 
northern province, situated on the Caspian Sea, a further revolt took shape, the ‘Jangali 
movement’, led by Mirza Kuchuk Khan. Both of these uprisings were anti-Persian, anti-
Russian, and essentially pan-Islamic in their outlook. 
 
 
The Revolution of the East 
With the eruption of these popular revolts across the Middle East, and with the 
emergence of the nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) in Anatolia, who was 
gradually able to unite the Anatolian heartland and thwart Western imperialist plans for 
its dismemberment, the Russian Communists began to take notice of the region. Joseph 
Stalin himself assumed responsibility for Eastern Communists within the Russian 
Communist Party,8 and a Department of International Propaganda for Eastern Peoples 
was set up in 1918. Persia was seen by the Russian Communists as having the greatest 
potential for revolution of all the eastern lands. The reason for this optimism was to be 
found in the wartime activities that had been taking place in Persian Azerbaijan. During 
the latter stages of the war, British troops occupied the western parts of Persia, and a 
military mission under General Lionel Dunsterville tried to press on towards Baku (in 
Russian Azerbaijan), and from there to Tiflis (in Russian Georgia). In Gilan, this was 
resisted by Mirza Kuchuk Khan, in what became known as the ‘Jangali movement’. This 
movement was led by a pan-Islamic organisation calling itself Etteḥād-e-Islām (Islamic 
Unity), and received funds and arms from the Ottomans and Germans. At the same time, 
soviets were being formed in Enzeli by deserted Russian soldiers, and local Communists 
from Turkestan and the wider Caucasus region. In this endeavour, they were supported 
by a group of Persian and Azerbaijani workers, calling themselves ᶜ Adalat (Justice), which 
had been formed in 1918. Eventually, the pan-Islamic ‘Jangali movement’ transformed 
itself into a patriotic movement and joined forces with the Communists.9 
 Meanwhile, on the Russian side of the border, revolutionary troops defeated 
General Anton Denikin’s assault on Moscow in the summer of 1919, after his troops had 
captured much of the Caucasus earlier in the year. A short-lived Azerbaijani Republic, 
which had been declared in 1918, was overthrown two years later following an invasion 
by the Red Army. On 28 April 1920, the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic was declared 
by the Russian Communists. At the occasion, Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, a Tatar Muslim 
Communist who was the Muslim Commissar in the Commissariat for Nationalities, stated 
the following on the role of Azerbaijan: 
 
                                                          
8 Or, more correctly, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Kommunisticheskaya Partiya 
Sovetskogo Soyuza, henceforth abbreviated as CPSU. 
9 See Sepehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960). 
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Now Soviet Azarbayjan [sic] with its old and experienced revolutionary 
proletariat and its sufficiently consolidated Communist party will become a 
revolutionary beacon for Persia, Arabia, and Turkey… From there it is possible 
to disturb the British in Persia and stretch friendly hands to Arabia and to lead 
the revolutionary movement in Turkey until it assumes the form of a class 
struggle.10     
 
Having secured the oil-rich Russian Azerbaijan, Soviet troops continued to advance into 
Persia. The official reason given was to eliminate the threat from White forces and British 
troops that were still present in Gilan, fighting the Jangali movement. Soviet troops and 
navy thus sailed across the Caspian Sea and landed in Enzeli on 18 May. Shortly 
thereafter, on 4 June, Gilan was declared a Republic. The foreign incursion was not 
accepted by the nationalists and patriots, and in July, Mirza Kuchuk Khan resigned from 
the government and took his supporters into the forest. The Persian and Azerbaijani 
Communists who were helping the Soviets became ever more isolated as local people 
turned away from the new republic. The gap widened further when Gilan was declared a 
Soviet Republic on 4 August. In the midst of this turmoil, the First Congress of the Persian 
Communist Party, which had been formed largely by members of the earlier ᶜAdalat 
group, was held in Enzeli on 23 June – at a time when the city was still occupied by the 
Red Army.11 
 The establishment of a Soviet Republic on Iranian soil, without proper local 
support, highlighted the basic problem of Communism in the East: what should the 
revolution be, and for whom was it to be carried out? These questions took on more 
urgency following the post-war failures of European Communism. Lenin and other 
Bolshevik leaders had been convinced that the revolution would triumph first in Western 
Europe – due to its advanced economic system – and then spread to Eastern lands. The 
success of the Russian Revolution modified this determinist outlook somewhat, and the 
defeat of the German Revolution in particular forced a change of view within the 
Bolshevik leadership. Thus, by 1920, the East seemed the only opportunity to spread the 
revolution. Having secured Russian Azerbaijan, and with inroads into Persia, the 
Comintern held its Second Congress between 19 July – 7 August. At the congress, a lively 
debate on the Revolution in the East took place between Lenin and M.N. Roy, an Indian 
Communist. Lenin saw the struggle in the East as mainly an anti-imperialist struggle that 
would weaken the colonial system and thus hasten the revolution in the European 
mother countries. The basic problem of the East was the lacking proletariat, and the 
backward economic systems. With an insufficient industrial base, a small capitalist class, 
and a large semi-feudal agricultural sector, Eastern countries were not suited for socialist 
revolution. Lenin therefore proposed that Eastern Communists should form alliances 
with the ‘national revolutionary’ sections of the ‘national bourgeoisie’. Roy, who had 
extensive experience of the duplicitous nature of the Indian ‘national bourgeoisie’ 
                                                          
10 Zhizn Nationalnostei [organ of Narkomindel, the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs], XIII, May 1920, 7, 
quoted in Zabih, Iran, pp. 10-11. 
11 For an in-depth study of the Soviet adventure in Gilan see, Schapour Ravasani, Sowjetrepublik Gilan: Die 
Sozialistische Bewegung im Iran seit Ende des 19. Jhdt. bis 1922 [The Gilan Soviet Republic: The Socialist 
movement in Iran since the end of the 19th cent. until 1922] (Berlin: Basis-Verlag, n.d.). 
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thought collaboration would be a recipe for disaster. Sultan Zadeh, a prominent Persian 
Communist who had co-founded the Persian Communist Party shortly before the 
Congress, put forward a compromise solution, arguing that the attitude towards the 
‘national bourgeoisie’ needed to be flexible and adapted to local circumstances. Lenin 
accepted the compromise, and drafted a resolution that stated the following: 
 
…the Communist International should support bourgeois-democratic national 
movements in colonial and backward countries only on condition that, in these 
countries, the elements of future proletarian parties, which will be communist 
not only in name, are brought together and trained to understand their special 
tasks, i.e., those of the struggle against the bourgeois-democratic movements 
within their own nations. The Communist International must enter into a 
temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy in the colonial and backward 
countries, but should not merge with it, and should under all circumstances 
uphold the independence of the proletarian movement even if it is in its most 
embryonic form…12 
 
 To prepare for the Eastern revolution, the Comintern decided to organise a 
Congress of the Peoples of the East, to be held in the newly ‘liberated’ city of Baku, the 
capital of Russian Azerbaijan. Following the conclusion of the Comintern congress, the 
Baku Congress was thus held in September, and was attended by no less than 1,891 
delegates from across Asia. The largest delegation was the Turkish, which counted 235 
delegates, closely followed by the Persian at 192. However, these delegates were 
generally not Communists, but anti-imperialist nationalists of varying hue. The Congress 
was chaired by Gregory Zinoviev, the head of the Comintern, who in his opening address 
called for a Holy War against the British Empire. Many of the delegates gave essentially 
nationalist speeches, but using a vocabulary intended to please the Communists. This 
prompted Zinoviev, and other Comintern spokesmen, to stress that the core of socialist 
struggle was the class struggle, which was not confined by national borders. He did 
concede, however, that the Comintern would have to cooperate with nationalist groups 
in the current situation. The Congress passed two resolutions, one calling on the 
‘oppressed masses of the peasantry’ to rely on support from the Comintern and to 
struggle for soviet power in the East. The other resolution called for the establishment of 
‘Soviet Government in the East’ as the objective of the revolution. The Congress was 
important insofar as it showed a real intent on the part of the Comintern and Western 
Communists to help the revolution advance in the East, but in terms of real, concrete 
impact, the achievements were decidedly more meagre. In fact, in both Turkey and Persia 
the Congress arguably sowed dissension between Communists and nationalists. A year 
later, at the Third Comintern Congress, which was held in Moscow from 22 June – 12 July 
1921, Javed Zadeh of the PCP reported that in Turkey, the Communist movement had split 
into three different parties and in Persia into two. ‘If anything, then,’ commented Zabih, 
                                                          
12 V.I. Lenin, ‘Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and Colonial Questions’, 28 July 1920, in Alan Adler 
(ed.), Theses, Resolutions and Manifestos of the First Four Congresses of the Third International, transl. Alix 
Holt and Barbara Holland, London: Pluto Press, 1983, p. 80. 
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‘the Baku Congress and its aftermath merely emphasized once again the Bolsheviks’ 
dilemma in the handling of nationalism. The best they could hope for was the 
transformation of the revolutionary movements after their initial, strongly nationalistic 
stage.’13 
 
 
Comintern and the Foundation of Arab Communism 
While the Baku Congress failed to achieve an immediate revolutionary impulse in the 
Eastern lands, the long-term commitment by the Comintern to organise a Communist 
movement in the region was more successful. The spread of Communist ideology, and the 
eventual creation of Communist parties in the Arab World, was largely due to efforts by 
the Comintern. The earliest organisational attempts took place in Egypt and Palestine, 
almost exclusively by Eastern European Jews who had migrated to these countries. 
However, Communist ideas had existed amongst the large foreign community in Egypt 
well before the outbreak of World War I. An influx of revolutionary Jews from Eastern 
Europe, as well as radical Arab intellectuals fleeing the oppressive climate of Sultan ᶜAbd 
al-Hamid’s Ottoman Empire, meant that Egypt was a dissident hotspot at the time. Among 
these refugees was Shibli Shumayyil, an Arab theoretician who was a staunch believer in 
science and socialism, and one of the first to proffer a ‘scientific’ critique of religion. One 
of his disciples was Niqula al-Haddad, another recent émigré from Syria, who became one 
of the pioneers of socialist thought in Egypt. He was influenced by the 1919 revolt, which 
he analysed ‘scientifically’ in a study called ᶜIlm al-Ijtimāᶜ (social sciences). He also 
published a book entitled al-Ishtirākiyyah (Socialism) in 1920. Another of Shumayyil’s 
followers was Salamah Musa, who became one of the most important intellectuals of 
modern Egypt. There was also a smaller group of Bolshevik Jews, who had escaped to 
Egypt following the failed 1905 Revolution in Russia. Together they formed Majmuᶜat al-
Balshafik (the Bolshevik Group), which was active until the 1917 October Revolution, 
following which most returned to Russia. Thus, on the eve of the war, there were many 
Communist and socialist groups in Egypt, although most of them were to be found in the 
large community of foreigners, which at its peak counted almost 237,000. With the 
outbreak of war, however, many foreigners left the country, which meant that the 
Communist movement suffered a heavy blow. Nevertheless, it also meant that the new 
movement that emerged after the war was dominated not by foreign elements, but by 
local Arabs and Jews.14 
 One such local Jew was Joseph Rosenthal, who became one of the most important 
persons in early Egyptian Communism. He was born in neighbouring Palestine in 1872 
to Ukrainian immigrant parents. In his teens, Joseph moved to Beirut, where he 
eventually set up a jewellery shop, which became a place where political activist would 
congregate to discuss political affairs. At first, he was neither a Communist nor even a 
                                                          
13 Zabih, Iran, pp. 34-35. 
14 For a more in-depth discussion of the pre-war socialist scene in Egypt, see Rami Ginat, A History of 
Egyptian Communism: Jews and Their Compatriots in Quest of Revolution, Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2011. 
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socialist, yet his activities were sufficient to attract the attention of the Ottoman 
authorities, which eventually compelled him to move to Alexandria in Egypt. There, he 
again took work as a jeweller, and he got involved with groups of Italian anarchists and 
socialists. He soon became disillusioned with these groups, as they were merely 
interested in conditions back in the homeland. For Joseph, the conditions of the Egyptian 
poor, especially the fellaḥīn (poor peasants), was the prime concern. He eventually moved 
to Cairo, where he got involved in the early workers’ movement, helping to organise 
strikes at the turn of the century. To demonstrate his commitment to Egypt he took up 
Egyptian citizenship, and once more moved back to Alexandria, where he worked as a 
watchmaker. The outbreak of the 1919 revolt, and the accompanying strikes that were 
carried out by workers in the cities, convinced Rosenthal that Egypt was ripe for a general 
federation of workers, which he called for with some success. In 1921, he organised the 
first celebration of May Day in Egyptian history. In an interview given to the Egyptian 
Gazette on that day, he stated that the fellaḥīn and the ‘millions of agricultural labourers’ 
would be the force to change Egypt. At the same time, however, he expressed scepticism 
about the possibility of spreading Communist ideology to these vast masses: “…there is 
not the slightest chance of the Egyptian fellah ever becoming a communist, and Lenin’s 
recent confession as to the complete failure of the Moscow Government to convert the 
Russian Moujik to communism is a good lesson for us in our future propaganda among 
the fellahin of Egypt.”15 This dilemma, it would turn out, was to become the crux of 
Communism in the Arab World, as the conditions of the Egyptian fellaḥīn were replicated 
throughout the region. In general, the fellaḥīn were the most wretched, uneducated, 
superstitious, and generally backward group in the Middle East. As Arab Communists 
were to find out, transforming the fellaḥīn into disciplined, class-conscious fighters for 
Communism would be a herculean task. 
 An Egyptian Communist Party (ECP) was founded in March 1920, following a joint 
meeting in Alexandria of various groups of Eastern European Jews. These activists were 
in contact with the Comintern, and although the new party was not recognised as a 
section of the Comintern, it was clear that it had support from Moscow. The ECP had a 
bureau in Vienna that was attached to the Austrian Communist Party. This bureau helped 
with the ‘technical needs’, such as bringing in printing material and literature. The 
Comintern connection could also be seen in the fact that the ECP sent a representative to 
the Third Comintern Congress in 1921, a certain Kari David Peler. Other prominent 
people involved in the ECP at the time included Samuel Zaslavsky, a Ukrainian Jew who 
had fled to Egypt, via Beirut, following arrest for Communist activity on numerous 
occasions in Ukraine. A Russian Jew, Avram Muisayvitch Katz and his sister Klara had 
come to Egypt following migration to Syria, then Palestine, and Greece. Another Russian 
Jew, Samuel Kirzon, had escaped via Odessa to Egypt, following involvement with the 
Socialist Revolutionary Party. A further Russian Jew with connection to Odessa was 
Edward Zaidman, who had served under the British in the war. Following the war, he 
settled down in Alexandria, where he met Rosenthal. They collaborated in their effort to 
spread communism in the city. Rosenthal, however, chose not to get involved directly in 
the ECP (possibly due to its ‘foreign’ character), instead he founded a study circle called 
                                                          
15 FO 371/6297. E6878/260/16, ‘Letter P.F. 37617 M.I.5.A.’, quoted in Ginat, Egyptian Communism, pp. 
32-33. 
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La Clarté (al-Wuḍūḥ) in 1921 together with other activists. This study circle was inspired 
by the French journal with the same name that had been set up in 1919 by Henri 
Barbusse, and the Egyptian group corresponded frequently with it.16 
 The Comintern was also instrumental in introducing Communism into Palestine. 
As in Egypt, Palestine had seen a large influx of Eastern European Jews before and after 
the war. There, of course, the main driving force of migration had been the Zionist 
movement, and many of the Eastern European Jews belonged to Socialist Zionist or 
Labour Zionist schools of thought. One such group was Mifleget Ha-Poᶜalim Ha-Sotsialistit 
(MPS, the Socialist Workers’ Party), which had broken away from the distinctly Zionist 
Poᶜale Tsiyon party in 1919. Contact between the MPS and the Comintern was established, 
possibly through Joseph Rosenthal’s daughter, Charlotte, who toured Palestine in 
November 1920. She was also sent to Moscow to pursue revolutionary studies at the 
Communist University of the Toilers of the East (Kommunisticheskii Universitet 
Trudyashchikhsya Vostoka, KUTV) from May 1922 to July 1923 – a path that many 
regional Communist leaders would later follow. The MPS applied for Comintern 
membership, but this was rejected due to the group’s Zionist nature. A split into several 
factions followed, but eventually, following the unification of the two largest groups in 
1923, the party was granted Comintern affiliation on condition that it changed its name 
to the Palestine Communist Party (Palestiner Komunistishe Partei, PKP) and rejected 
Zionism. This finally happened in March 1924, and the PKP became the official Comintern 
section in Palestine. A key organiser during this early phase was Yehiel Kossoy, a 
Ukrainian Jew who had arrived in Palestine with the Jewish Battalion during the war. 
Kossoy often travelled under the pseudonym ‘Constantine Weiss’, and wrote in the 
Comintern organ Inprecor (International Press Correspondence) under the name 
‘Avigdor’. In 1921, he travelled to Moscow to negotiate Comintern membership on behalf 
of the MPS. There, he received training and was later sent to Egypt to help organise the 
ECP. He married Charlotte Rosenthal, and worked with Joseph in La Clarté. The 
dominance of Jews in the PKP, in a country that was still overwhelmingly Arab, 
constituted a major obstacle to the spreading of Communist influence in Palestine, and so 
the Comintern instructed the PKP leaders to ‘Arabise’ the party. This directive created 
much resentment in the rank-and-file (and eventually a split along ethnic lines in the 
1930s), but a few Arab nationalists whom were found to be sympathetic to the 
Communist cause were sent for training at the KUTV throughout the 1920s. Thus, by its 
Seventh Congress in 1930, the PKP could eventually present a Central Committee with an 
Arab majority.17 Among the Palestinian Arabs that took to Communism, the Christian 
community, especially the Greek Orthodox, stands out.18 This follows the minority 
pattern observed in most other Arab countries. 
                                                          
16 Ginat, Egyptian Communism, pp. 41-45. 
17 For a fuller discussion of the problems caused by this set-up, see Johan Franzén, ‘Communism versus 
Zionism: The Comintern, Yishuvism, and the Palestine Communist Party’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 
36, No. 2, 2007, pp. 6-24; for a wider discussion of the PKP, see Musa Budeiri, The Palestine Communist 
Party, 1919–1948: Arab and Jew in the Struggle for Internationalism, Haymarket Books, 2010. 
18 For a discussion of the historical link between orthodoxy and Communism, see Merav Mack, ‘Orthodox 
and Communist: A History of a Christian Community in Mandate Palestine and Israel’, British Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 45, no. 4, 2015, pp. 384-400. 
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 In Syria and Lebanon, too, the Comintern influence was marked. In 1924, Yusuf 
Ibrahim Yazbak, a local activist, was visited by Joseph Berger-Barzilai of the PKP, who had 
been tasked with helping to establish a Communist movement in Lebanon and Syria. 
Later in the year, on 24 October, Yazbak, together with Fuᵓad al-Shamali, Farid Touma, 
Ilyas Qashami, and Butrus Hishimah established the Lebanese People’s Party (Ḥizb al-
Shaᶜb). As in Palestine, the early phase was dominated by Christian Arabs. However, in 
Lebanon and Syria, Armenian Christians also played an important role initially, and 
within this community a Communist organisation called the Spartacus League (modelled 
on the Spartakusbund), had been formed earlier. In 1925, the two groups came together 
and established the Syrian-Lebanese Communist Party (SLCP, al-Ḥizb al-Shuyūᶜī al-Sūrī 
al-Lubnānī). The new party, however, immediately became embroiled in the fractious 
politics of the era. In the summer, the great Syrian revolt broke out, and when the SLCP 
openly supported it, the entire leadership was arrested, and remained locked up until a 
general amnesty in 1928. The Comintern ordered the PKP to take temporary control of 
the SLCP’s affairs. Upon release, the SLCP was able to send a representative to the Sixth 
Comintern Congress, held from 17 July – 1 September 1928. There, the party received 
official recognition as a Comintern section, and was released from the PKP guardianship. 
In the early 1930s, the party was able to expand its activities considerably, and a number 
of promising young activists joined the party. Among them was Khaled Bakdash, a fierce 
Kurd who would emerge as the strongman of the party in the 1940s and 50s. Others 
included Niqula Shawi and Farjallah al-Hilu, who were also destined to play important 
roles. As had happened in Palestine, the SLCP was instructed to ‘Arabise’ to move away 
from its reliance on minorities, primarily Armenians. As with other Arab Communist 
parties, a select number of recruits were sent to Moscow for training, most notably 
Bakdash who stayed in Moscow from 1933 until 1937. There, he was appointed by the 
Comintern as the representative of Arab Communist parties.19 
 In Iraq, Communist ideas had first been introduced by Russian soldiers stationed 
in the northern parts of the country during the war. These early encounters, however, 
were not of a lasting nature. Instead, it was Husayn al-Rahhal, a Shiᶜi of mixed Arab-
Turkoman descent, who first started a Marxist study circle in the early 1920s. Husayn had 
earlier been living in Germany with his father, an Ottoman officer, who had been 
stationed there following the war. In 1919, Husayn witnessed the failed German 
Revolution, led by the Spartakusbund, which made an indelible impression on him. In 
1926, he formed Nādi al-Taḍāmun (The Solidarity Club) together with other young 
activists. While only lasting two years, this club brought together many of the future 
Communist leaders. In southern Iraq, Communist ideas were first introduced by Petros 
Vasili, an Assyrian who had grown up in Tiflis, Georgia, but who originally stemmed from 
ᶜAmadiyyah in northern Iraq, whence his father had emigrated. Vasili entered the country 
in 1922 as a professional revolutionary. In the south, he met fellow Assyrian Yusuf Salman 
Yusuf – soon to be known under his party name, Comrade Fahad – and his brother Daᵓud. 
The two brothers, together with Ghali Zuwayyid, a slave of the wealthy Saᶜdun family, set 
up a Communist study circle in al-Nasiriyyah in 1928. Eventually, the two strands came 
together, and in 1934, the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP, al-Ḥizb al-Shuyūᶜī al-ᶜIrāqī) was 
                                                          
19 For a fuller discussion of the SLCP, see Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, The Communist 
Movement in Syria and Lebanon, University Press of Florida, 1998. 
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formed. Similarly to the ECP, PKP, and SLCP, the Iraqis also sent a number of committed 
activists for training at the KUTV, most notably Fahad himself, who trained there from 
1935-1937. He returned to Iraq in early 1938, and, following a period of turmoil in the 
party – brought about by a failed attempt to organise cells in the army, something that 
resulted in many arrests of party members and the promulgation of an anti-Communist 
law – he eventually took over the leadership in 1941.20 
 
 
Nationalism and Populism 
The Second World War marked a turning point for the Middle Eastern Communist parties. 
The alliance between the Soviet Union and Britain during the war meant that the 
repression of Communists was considerably relaxed. The Soviets responded by closing 
down the Comintern in 1943. On the one hand, this decision deprived the local 
Communists of an organisational framework for their activities, but on the other, it also 
removed some of the British and French suspicion that Middle Eastern Communists were 
merely Soviet agents. Following the Seventh, and final,  Comintern Congress, which had 
been held from 25 July – 20 August 1935, and which had endorsed the popular front 
against fascism line, the Middle Eastern Communist parties entered into what might be 
called a ‘populist’ phase. The Comintern resolution had also established that in the 
colonised world, the Communists should struggle to achieve ‘national’, rather than 
‘popular’ fronts, that is, to seek alliances with the ‘national bourgeoisie’ against 
imperialism. In Iran, this populism was particularly noticeable. There, the earlier Soviet-
led Communist movement had largely crumbled following the ascent to the throne of 
Reza Shah, who went on to ban Communist activity in 1931. Yet, in the late 1930s, a more 
indigenous movement took shape. A group of Iranian Communists, most of whom were 
from a middle class background, had formed around Dr. Taghi Erani, an Azerbaijani 
physicist who had been educated in Berlin. In 1937, the group was arrested, which helped 
their radicalisation. Dr. Erani died inside prison in 1940, but when the group’s members 
were released the following year, they went on to set up a new Communist organisation 
– Ḥezb-e Tūdeh Ῑrān (the Party of the Masses of Iran). The new party was able to exploit 
the relative freedom caused by Reza Shah’s removal by the allies the same year, and the 
fact that the Red Army was once more stationed in the northern parts of the country 
because of the war. Tudeh was not openly Communist, instead stressing that it supported 
the Iranian constitution and was fighting for its full implementation.21 The same wartime 
strategy could be noticed also in neighbouring Iraq, where the ICP in 1944 convened its 
First Conference, which also called for the revival of the constitution and in general put 
forward a populist programme.22 The SLCP, too, held a Congress from December 1943 – 
January 1944, which put forward a similarly moderate programme. In fact, such was the 
                                                          
20 For an exhaustive discussion of the ICP’s early phase, see Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the 
Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, 
Ba‘thists and Free Officers, London: Saqi, 2004 (orig. publ. by Princeton Univ. Press, 1978); see also Johan 
Franzén, Red Star Over Iraq: Iraqi Communism Before Saddam, London: Hurst & Co., 2011. 
21 Zabih, Iran, pp. 65-70. 
22 Franzén, Red Star, p. 41.  
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level of its moderation, that the programme did not even mention the word ‘socialism’.23 
As part of the populist drive, an effort to set up or expand trade unions was also a feature 
of the wartime and immediate postwar period.  
 The period of legality during the war and the first few years thereafter provided 
the Communist parties with an opportunity to expand their operations, and in general 
this short space of time constituted the only moment in their history when, however 
briefly, they were able to operate freely. The Tudeh in particular seized the opportunity, 
and within a few years of its foundation, it had emerged as a countrywide mass party, 
largely due to its focused attention to labour questions and support for trade unions. At 
the time of its First Congress in 1944, the Tudeh counted a membership of some 25,000 
people. Bolstered by the Soviet presence (Britain and the Soviet Union effectively 
occupied the country throughout the war), the party organised large demonstrations to 
put pressure on the government at a time when central government was at its weakest. 
A young Mohammed Reza Shah had been installed to replace his father in 1941, and 
throughout the war, he remained a puppet of the Allies. However, before the Tudeh was 
able to threaten the regime seriously, a reversal of fortunes occurred. In 1949, a failed 
attempt on the Shah’s life prompted the regime to clamp down on leftist organisations, 
banning Tudeh, and generally restrict liberties that had been granted during the previous 
period. The young Shah followed his father’s example and turned his rule absolutist. To 
undermine the parliamentary system he introduced a senate, whose members would be 
partially appointed by him. He also strengthened the intelligence apparatus to prevent 
any further attempts on his life. All of these measures meant that the honeymoon period 
was over for the Tudeh, and once more Communism was an outlawed activity in Iran.24 
 A similar trajectory was followed by the Arab Communist parties, but their 
postwar experience was overshadowed by the Palestine Question. The temporary boost 
of Communist popularity in the Arab World that followed the Soviet defeat of Nazism, 
was quickly undone when in November 1947, the Soviet Union voted for partition of 
Palestine in the newly established United Nations. The Soviet U-turn, and a U-turn it was 
for Communists had denounced Zionism and its objectives in Palestine for as long as the 
movement had existed, caused shock and consternation among Arab Communists, 
including the Jews within their ranks (whose numbers at the time were considerable). At 
first, the ICP and the SLCP, which had separated into a Syrian (SCP) and a Lebanese (LCP) 
branch in 1943, went against the Soviet position. In Palestine, ethnic tensions had already 
caused a split of the party in 1943 when the Arab Communists had broken away to form 
ᶜUṣbat al-Taḥarrur al-Waṭanī (the National Liberation League, NLL). The remaining 
Jewish Communists hailed the partition and changed the name of their party to 
HaMiflagah HaKomunistit HaᵓEretz Yisraᵓelit (MAKEI, the Communist Party of the Land 
of Israel) in 1947. The NLL was decidedly against partition, as was the ICP, LCP, and SCP. 
In Egypt, the problem was less straightforward. There, the Communist movement had 
developed into a kaleidoscope of different groups of varying size and composition, some 
of which were less antagonistic to partition. Nevertheless, despite the initial opposition, 
both the ICP and the Syrian-Lebanese parties eventually toed the Soviet line, and by the 
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summer of 1948, they began advocating an ‘independent democratic Arab state in the 
Arab part of Palestine’.25 The NLL, too, came around to the Soviet position, and despite 
the earlier tension with the Jewish Communists, a merger between the NLL and MAKEI 
eventually took place following the Arab-Israeli War, producing the new Israeli 
Communist Party (HaMiflagah HaKomunistit HaYisraᵓelit).  
The Communist support for partition (and indirectly for Zionism) caused a wave 
of state repression against the Arab Communist parties, and hostile animosity from Arab 
nationalists in general. Overnight, the Communists went from respected anti-imperialist 
activists within the general fold of Arab nationalism to treasonous pariahs that were 
beyond the pale. The headquarters of the SCP in Damascus was torched by an angry mob 
in late November 1947, and at the same time the party’s organ, Ṣawt al-Shaᶜb (the Voice 
of the People), was banned. In Iraq, a general crackdown on Communists that predated 
the partition vote had resulted in the arrest of much of the party leadership, including the 
First Secretary, ‘Comrade Fahad’. He and other leaders were sentenced to death, but 
following international pressure, the death sentences were commuted to life 
imprisonment. However, following a wave of demonstrations in early 1948, later 
remembered as al-Wathbah (the Leap), which had been caused by the signing of a new 
Anglo-Iraqi treaty at Portsmouth, Fahad was re-tried and once more sentenced to death. 
The sentence was carried out in February 1949, when he and three other Communists 
were hanged in four different Baghdad squares.26 In Lebanon, too, repression was 
relentless and the LCP was banned in the summer of 1948. The SCP was forced 
underground and a decision to move its headquarters from Damascus to Beirut was 
taken. 
Whether because of this repression or perhaps because of an influx of a younger 
generation of Communists in the early 1950s, the Communist parties in the Middle East 
radicalised their positions considerably, and up until the mid-50s a ‘revolutionist phase’ 
is clearly noticeable. In Iran, the Communists joined nationalists and other activists 
during the widespread protests in 1952 that ultimately helped to reinstate Mohammed 
Mossadegh to power. Although the Tudeh played a crucial role during this episode, they 
were eventually betrayed by the nationalists once their common objective had been met. 
After Mossadegh’s ousting in a CIA-sponsored coup the following year, all-out repression 
of the party and its auxiliary organisations ensued.27 The Party leadership concluded that 
had they possessed a trained military apparatus at the peak of the protests they would 
have been in a good position to seize power. A decision to militarise the party and prepare 
it for violent revolution was thus taken. However, the next year much of the work was 
undone when the authorities discovered a vast network of Tudeh supporters in the army 
– some 600 officers, ranging from non-commissioned officers to colonels.28 In Iraq, too, 
radicalism was brewing. Despite the repression of 1947-49, which had almost broken the 
back of the party, the ICP had regrouped and recruited new members by the early 1950s. 
In 1952, it played a key role in the Inṭifāḍah that rocked the country in a similar way as 
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the 1948 Wathbah had done. Revolutionism was evidenced within its ranks as well when 
in 1954 it created a military organisation, al-Lajnah al-Waṭaniyyah li-Ittiḥād al-Junūd wa 
l-Ḍubbāṭ (The National Committee for Unity of Soldiers and Officers).29 
 
 
Violent Revolution, ‘Arab Socialism’, and the End of the Movement 
The year 1956 marked a watershed moment for Middle Eastern Communists. Three 
major events took place during this year: the thwarting of the Hungarian uprising, the 
Suez Crisis, and the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. The first of these events did not have 
much impact on Middle Eastern affairs, but it showed the extent to which the Soviet Union 
was willing to use force to protect its sphere of influence. The Suez Crisis, on the other 
hand, had immense impact as it essentially transformed Gamal ᶜAbd al-Nasir into an ‘Arab 
Hero’ throughout the region, and generally made his strand of pan-Arabist ideology 
dominant. However, it was the Twentieth Congress and the changes in ideology it brought 
with it that most transformed Middle Eastern Communist parties. The Twentieth 
Congress, which is perhaps best known for Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’, introduced 
significant changes in Soviet ideology. A theory of ‘peaceful co-existence’ in international 
relations, and a theory of a ‘peaceful road to socialism’ were the most radical changes. 
Undoubtedly, these changes were linked to the Cold War, which ever more was becoming 
the dominant feature of the era. The ‘peaceful road’ proposed a theory that essentially 
rendered the Communist party superfluous as it proclaimed that the socialist stage could 
be reached by relying on the ‘national bourgeoisie’ alone. The role of the Communists was 
therefore not to seize power, but to support ‘national-democratic’ movements and help 
turn them pro-Soviet. Later, this was further developed in the ‘non-capitalist path to 
socialism’ theory, which argued that the capitalist stage could be by-passed altogether so 
that regimes in the ‘Third World’ could move straight from a semi-colonial, semi-feudal 
stage to socialism. In reality, what these theories argued, was that political, rather than 
economic, liberation was what mattered. It was good enough if a country achieved 
political independence from imperialism, as with the help and assistance of the Soviet 
Union, it could now avoid remaining in economic dependence. The irony, of course, was 
that it created a new type of economic dependence – on the Soviet Union.30  
Did Cold War logic force these changes in the Soviet outlook? Did Stalin’s death 
and Khrushchev’s ambitions play a part? Did the war and its consequences impel Soviet 
leaders to view international relations through a more Realist lens? Did 
bureaucratisation and routinisation of Soviet society and the CPSU leadership kill the 
original revolutionary idea? Alternatively, had Stalin’s notion of ‘Socialism in one country’ 
already done that? These are all important questions, albeit very difficult to answer. What 
is indisputable, though, is that from the outbreak of the Cold War, Soviet foreign policy 
became dominated by concerns of ‘national interest’ rather than ‘world revolution’. From 
                                                          
29 Franzén, Red Star, pp. 61-68. 
30 For a thorough discussion, and rejection, of the non-capitalist theory in the case of Egypt, see Esmael 
Hosseinzadeh, Soviet Non-Capitalist Development: The Case of Nasser's Egypt (Praeger, 1989). 
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the point of view of Middle Eastern Communists, this development was disastrous. The 
new Soviet policy was put into practice with the Egyptian revolution in 1952 and the 
subsequent rise of Nasir from the mid-fifties onwards, followed by the Iraqi revolution in 
1958, and other so-called ‘Arab Socialist’ revolutions in places like Yemen, Algeria, and 
Syria. The battle for Nasir’s loyalty was the standout feature of the early Cold War in the 
Middle East. As the leader of the largest Arab country, attracting him to one’s side was 
seen as crucial by both Superpowers. Egypt had also long been a pillar of British imperial 
strategy, with a large British base guarding the Suez Canal. Thus, Nasir’s switch from the 
American sphere to the Soviet, following broken American promises to fund the building 
of the Aswan dam was a great victory for the Soviets – at least symbolically. However, for 
the Egyptian Communists it was catastrophic. Nasir was an anti-Communist and clamped 
down on the Egyptian Left with menace, banning all political parties except his own 
officially approved Arab Socialist Union. The Baᶜth Party in Syria and Iraq were equally 
hostile to Communism, if not more. In February 1963, the Iraqi Baᶜthists joined ᶜAbd al-
Salam ᶜAref in a coup to overthrow ᶜAbd al-Karim Qasim, who had led the country since 
the 1958 Revolution. As a counterweight to Nasir’s pan-Arabism, the ICP had put their 
full support behind Qasim in the early stages of the new regime – only to be betrayed by 
him later. The 1963 coup saw thousands of ICP-members and sympathisers, and general 
Qasim-loyalists, killed by Baᶜthist ‘National Guards’. The Baᶜthists were themselves 
betrayed by ᶜAref later in the year, and he and his brother, ᶜAbd al-Rahman, ruled Iraq 
until 1968, when the Baᶜthists once more took power.31  
The Baᶜthist takeover in Iraq in February 1963, and a month later also in Syria 
marked the beginning of the end for Arab Communists. ‘Arab Socialism’, the ideology 
espoused by the Baᶜhist regimes and by Nasir proved to be the final undoing of 
Communist ideology. The reason for this was two-fold. Firstly, ‘Arab Socialism’ took those 
elements of Communist ideology – social justice, land reform, anti-imperialism, etc. – that 
had made it popular in the first place, and combined these with Arab nationalism, which 
was already immensely popular at the time. Secondly, the Baᶜth Party emulated 
Communist organisational practices, establishing country-wide branches and cells that 
were secret and clandestine. While the physical threat of Baᶜthism was indeed very real 
in Iraq, it was in the ideational sphere in which the battle for the masses was lost. By 
portraying themselves as socialists and nationalists, the Baᶜthists were always at an 
advantage compared to the Communists, who risked being attacked for lacking 
patriotism. Thus, despite the fact that the Baᶜth Party had attempted to physically 
eliminate the Iraqi Communist movement, and Nasir’s increasing authoritarianism, Arab 
Communists thought the spread of ‘Arab Socialism’ was working to their advantage: 
 
As a result of the successes won by world socialism, socialist ideas are 
becoming increasingly popular among the masses, a fact which is compelling 
statesmen and public personalities in the Arab countries to speak of 
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socialism as a perspective in the national and social advance of the young 
sovereign states. […] There is no denying that the ideas of so-called “Arab 
socialism” have exerted their influence on students, intellectuals and also a 
large section of the peasantry. […] Another positive feature of “Arab 
socialism” is that the word “socialism” has gained currency in the Arab East.32 
 
In other words, the lip service being paid to ‘socialism’ by Arab leaders was taken as an 
indication of Communist progression and influence.33  
 Arguably, however, the battle had already been lost at an earlier stage when the 
Communists had attempted to infuse a revolutionary Marxist understanding of Arab 
nationalism and the Pan-Arabist objective to unify the Arabic-speaking world into a 
unitary state. Such was the dominance of nationalist thought that no political 
organisation could survive without declaring its unwavering support for it. For the Iraqi 
Communists, and to a lesser extent the Syrian Communists, the clash came to a head in 
1959 when attempts by Gamal ᶜAbd al-Nasir to undermine the rule of ᶜAbd al-Karim 
Qasim by sponsoring a nationalist rebellion in Mosul came to nought. The fact that the 
Iraqi Communists had sided with Qasim in his falling out with Nasir in the aftermath of 
the Iraqi Revolution of 14 July 1958, meant that the Qasim regime was branded ‘pro-
Communist’ by Nasir (and by the West). At the height of this battle, ᶜAziz al-Hajj, himself 
ironically a Kurd, but also a prominent member of the ICP, outlined the Communist 
position on Arab nationalism in the following manner: 
 
Arab nationalism is an evident reality that even its enemies cannot disregard. 
Arab nationalism is a tangible fact that crystallises and develops, and is being 
embodied in a stormy revolutionary movement reflecting the hopes and 
wishes of eighty million people, and their intense yearning for the return of 
their usurped rights, and the building of a new Arab life that contributes to the 
building of a new human civilisation. […]  
…today, it is not an issue of a number of parties or leaders, but a giant 
mass movement of all the Arab peoples, it is the reflection of a nation existing 
in reality, firmly rooted in the Arab land, whether the enemy recognises it or 
not and whether this or that is aware of it. This nation possesses all the 
national characteristics of [being] one nation. That is because its being [is] a 
firm group of people that was formed historically, and lives on a common land 
(despite the existing invented borders) and speaks a common language, and it 
has increasing economic assets that complete each other, and it has a shared 
psychological basis that finds an expression in the shared Arab culture, 
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traditions, and in the mutual national aspirations towards complete liberation, 
and a happy life and towards the eradication of the manufactured division.  
The Sultans of the House of ᶜUthman [the Ottomans] and their racist 
Turkish allies, and after them the new Imperialism in particular, all of these 
have tried for tens of years to erase these national traits in order to keep the 
Arab nation fragmented to facilitate its enslavement and exploitation, but 
these features were able to resist and preserve their bond because they were 
original ones.34 
 
This passage epitomises the Communist ambivalence on nationalism. While trying to 
couch their analyses with Marxist-Leninist phraseology, and insisting on the 
revolutionary nature of the ‘Arab nation’ as justification for their position, even the most 
cursory glance on the vast Arab Communist literature on nationalism gives an indelible 
impression that in fact there was very little, if anything, to distinguish between the 
ostensibly ‘scientific’ Marxist interpretation and the highly Metaphysical understanding 
of nationalism put forward by non-Communists.  
For obvious reasons, Communist views on the Baᶜth Party were initially hostile, 
especially in Iraq. The Baᶜthists were dismissed as ‘fascists’ that could not be trusted. 
However, soon after the Baᶜthist takeover in Iraq and Syria this assessment began to be 
amended, prompted by a changing Soviet evaluation of the Baᶜthist movement. Soviet 
experts distinguished between an ‘extremist right-wing’ and the ‘healthy forces of the 
party’. Soon, similar positions were echoed by the Arab Communists. Despite the fact that 
thousands of Iraqi Communists had been killed and arrested, and Communists were 
banned in Egypt and Syria, the Soviet Union continued to offer unconditional support for 
Nasir, the Baᶜthist regimes, and for Arab nationalist military regimes in general. This 
could be seen in Khrushchev’s important visit to Egypt in 1964, officially to inaugurate 
the High Dam at Aswan, when he held meetings with Nasir, Iraq’s ᶜAref, and Yemen’s 
ᶜAbdallah al-Sallal. In fact, following that visit, the view of ‘Arab Socialism’, and of Nasir 
in particular, changed considerably. The Iraqi Communists especially, who had fallen out 
with Nasir during the Qasim regime, now made a U-turn, following the Soviet 
endorsement of the Egyptian regime.35 
In Iran, the absurdity of the Soviet position was even plainer to see. The Shah’s 
Iran was an important US ally against the Soviets, but, despite this, the Soviet Union 
maintained amicable relations with the country – even when in 1955, Iran (along with 
Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Britain) formed the so-called Baghdad Pact, a NATO-style 
military organisation tasked with containing the Soviets. In 1962, following a period of 
worsening Soviet-Iranian relations, the situation again improved when the Shah 
promised that he would not allow American military bases on Iranian soil. This promise, 
along with the Shah’s ‘White Revolution’ in the 1960s, was enough to create a positive 
Soviet image of Iran, which the Iranian Communists, despite their misgivings, had to 
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follow. Writing on the topic in the mid-1960s, Zabih commented that while the Tudeh 
leadership mostly accepted the situation, particularly as many within that leadership had 
sought refuge in the Soviet Union, ‘the lower echelons of the party and the membership 
at large will probably not remain impervious to the growing Soviet accommodation with 
the Iranian regime.’36 
That this was the case could be seen in the late 1960s when, following the Soviet-
Chinese split on the international level, many Communists throughout the region 
questioned the leaderships of their parties. In 1965-66, some senior Tudeh leaders whose 
sympathies lay with the Chinese argued that ‘violent revolution’ was ‘the only way to the 
liberation of the Iranian masses’. As a result, they were thrown out of the Central 
Committee. Later, in the summer of 1966, a split of the party along these lines occurred.37 
In Iraq, too, the ICP was threatened by a revolutionary base. There, a full split of the party 
occurred when ᶜAziz al-Hajj broke away to form the ‘Central Command’ group (al-
Qiyādah al-Markaziyyah) in 1967-68. In 1968, this group declared a revolution and began 
armed struggle in the southern marshes. However, the attempt was quickly crushed by 
the Baᶜth Party, following their coup in July 1968. The remainder of the ICP came out in 
full support of the Soviet Union, denouncing the renegades – as did the Tudeh 
leadership.38  
In Egypt, Nasir co-opted some Communists, who received well-paid jobs in the 
civil service in exchange for abandoning their struggle. Those that refused were thrown 
in jail along with other opposition groups. In Syria, following the Baᶜthist coup of 1966, 
carried out by Salah Jadid, Khaled Bakdash, the SCP leader, changed his earlier negative 
assessment of the Baᶜthists – something that was prompted by the new regime allowing 
him to return from his exile in Beirut.39 In Iraq, the ICP eventually signed a ‘National 
Front’ agreement with the Baᶜthist regime in 1973, following the Baᶜthist nationalisation 
of the oil industry the previous year, and general social reforms. This move was 
unpopular by the party base, but supported by the Soviet Union, which had formed ever-
closer ties with the regime since its seizure of power in 1968. The ‘alliance’ ended in 1979, 
when Saddam Husayn usurped all powers and declared himself President, following 
which an all-out crackdown of Communists began – forcing members to either flee or go 
underground.40  
 
 
Conclusion 
By the 1970s, the Communist movement in the Arab World and Iran was as good as dead. 
However, it could be argued that it had died much earlier, during the years of dramatic 
change in the mid-fifties when Soviet ‘national interests’ finally trumped the ‘proletarian 
internationalism’ of the early Communist movement. Seen from this perspective, we may 
                                                          
36 Zabih, Iran, p. 241. 
37 Zabih, Iran, pp. 241-245. 
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40 Franzén, Red Star, pp. 233-243. 
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conclude that the Middle Eastern Communist movement, although achieving notable 
success in some areas such as trade unionism, and mass support in countries such as Iran 
and Iraq, was ultimately a failure. The movement was caught between two major forces 
that dominated the era – Soviet Communism and nationalism. When the Communists 
sought alliances with the nationalists they were dismissed as Soviet agents; when they 
sought the support of the Soviet Union, they were sacrificed in the interest of spreading 
Soviet influence in the area. In other words, theirs was an impossible situation, and this 
proved to be their ultimate undoing.  
 
 
